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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS"
ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK * *
Legal liability of a hospital for injury to a patient may, depending
upon the facts, be based upon either the negligence of the hospital
entity itself or upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The former
type of liability is sometimes referred to as corporate negligence and
is illustrated by the furnishing of defective equipment, negligence in
the selection or retention of incompetent personnel, or the failure to
exercise the required degree of care in the maintenance of buildings
and grounds. The second type of liability is vicarious. Vicarious lia-
bility is the responsibility of A for the wrongful or negligent act of B
committed against C when A himself had no part in B's conduct. Liter-
ally translated, the doctrine of respondeat superior means "let the
master answer" and it operates to render the master liable for the
wrongs of his servant and the principal liable for the wrongs of his
agent committed while furthering the master's or principal's business.
In addition to this liability of the master or principal the negligent
or wrongful actor is always individually liable for his act. This paper
is concerned with the possible vicarious liability of a hospital for the
wrongful or negligent act of a physician, an intern, a nurse, or other
person working within the hospital. It is not concerned with the legal
responsibility for corporate negligence, nor is it concerned with cases
defining negligence or the standard of proof required.' Throughout
the discussion it shall be assumed that the actor was at fault in causing
injury, thereby incurring individual liability to the patient with the
issue then becoming whether or not the hospital is also responsible.
The patient, of course, has only one recovery. If he is successful in
receiving compensation for his loss from the hospital, then it has a
legal right to recover from the actor. In practice such right is seldom
asserted except as insurance carriers see fit to do so.
The applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to a hos-
pital depends, first, upon the type of hospital involved and the law of
the particular state in which it exists and, second, upon the type of
employment relationship existing between the hospital and the person
causing injury to the patient. Involved in the first issue are the doc-
trines of governmental and charitable immunity whereas the second
Originally printed in Southern Hospitals. Reprinted by permission.
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issue is concerned with the matter of identifying the employment rela-
tionship as either master-servant, principal-agent, or employer-inde-
pendent contractor.
Hospitals are organized as privately-owned, for-profit institutions,
privately-owned, non-profit organizations, or governmental hospitals.
The private for-profit hospital is termed a proprietary hospital and it
may be a corporation, a partnership, or a sole proprietorship. In all
states the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the proprietary
hospital inasmuch as it is treated by the law the same as any business
that exists for the purpose of making a profit for its owners. Hence, the
only issue determining the imposition of vicarious liability is whether
or not the negligent actor was an agent or a servant of the hospital.
Governmental hospitals may be owned and operated by the federal
government, a state government or a political subdivision of the state,
such as a municipality or a county. American common law adopted
from England the principle that a sovereign government is immune
from suit based upon the negligence of the government's agents
and servants unless it consents to the suit. The English immunity doc-
trine was based upon the maxim that the king could do no wrong.
Since both the federal government and the various state governments
are considered sovereign, their hospitals have traditionally been im-
mune from the application of respondeat superior.
In both England and Canada it is now said that a public govern-
mental body operating a hospital is liable in negligence just as a private
individual would be under similar circumstances. 2 No such sweeping
change has yet occurred in the United States.
However, hospitals owned and operated by the United States gov-
ernment are amenable to suit by virture of the Federal Torts Claim
Act, effective retroactively to January 1, 1945. 3 All personnel in a
federal hospital are considered to be employees of the government
rendering it liable for their negligence. This is true for a physician
on the staff of the hospital even though the law of some states would
consider him to be an independent contractor rather than a servant of
the hospital. The hospital is vicariously liable for his malpractice.
4
Both servicemen injured in federal hospitals "as an incident to the
service" and federal prisoners are denied the benefits of the act.5 This
is for the reason that these people have a distinct federal relationship
to the government and they are given the possibility of compensation
2 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, 2 K. B. 343 (1951). Nyberg v. Provost Munici-
cipal Hospital Board, 1 Dominion Law Reports 969 (1927).
3 28 U. S. C. §§1346 (b), 2671-2680 (1950).
4 Tessier v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 779 (D. Mass. 1958). Rufino v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. N.Y., 1954). Dishman v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950).
5 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Berman v. United States, 170
F. Stipp. 107 (E. D. N. Y., 1959).
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for injuries under other federal statutes specifically covering their
status.
As a general rule, state hospitals are immune from liability unless
the common law has been changed by statute. All state functions in-
cluding the operation of a hospital are governmental. General waivers
of immunity are found in four states.6 In two states, statutes provide
that immunity is waived to the extent of existing liability insurance
coverage.7 Similarly, Louisiana has held that governmental immunity
is not a defense for an insurance carrier although the case did not
involve a state hospital." It has been the general rule that statutory
authority granted to state hospitals to sue and to be sued does not
constitute a waiver of tort immunity although there is dictum to the
contrary in Tennessee.9 Courts do not feel free to overrule the immu-
nity of a state as this matter is considered to be purely a function of
the legislature. It may be predicted, however, with reasonable certainty
that there will be increased legislative activity in this area during the
next quarter century as there is evidence to suggest that the attitude
toward the role and responsibility of state government is changing.
In regard to the liability of a state's political subdivisions for
negligence, some courts have said that a county is an involuntary instru-
mentality of the state for the performance of governmental functions
and, hence, the county automatically possesses the same sovereign
immunity as the state.10 The majority of the courts have, however,
approached the problem of county and municipal liability by distin-
guishing between governmental and proprietary functions. When con-
ducting a governmental function there is immunity. In contrast, the
conduct of a proprietary function is in effect competition with private
business and the consequence is liability. It is not an easy task to dis-
tinguish between governmental and proprietary functions. A given
activity may be considered governmental in one state and proprietary
in another. In discussing the distinction, the Ohio court, in City of
Wooster v. Arbenz,11 enunciated certain guiding principles as follows:
In performing those duties which are imposed upon the state
as obligations of sovereignty, such as protection from crime, or
fires, or contagion, or preserving the peace and health of citi-
6 Ala. Comp. Law Ann. §56-7-1, 56-7-7 (Supp. 1958). Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§44.070 (Supp. 1958) (Board of Claims hears claims against state for negligent
acts and may pay claimant up to $10,000). N.Y. Court of Claims Act Section 8.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§143-291 (1958) (North Carolina Industrial Commission
operates as a court to hear tort claims and may award damages up to $10,000).
7Del. Code Ann. Title 18, §516 (Supp. 1958). Idaho Code §§41-3304, 41-3305
(Supp. 1957).
8 Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. Ct. App.
1936).
9 Central Hospital for Insane v. Adams, 134 Tenn. 429, 183 S.W. 1032 (1916).
10 Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 688, 185 So. 175 (1938).
11 116 Ohio 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
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zens and protecting their property, it is settled that the function
is governmental, and if the municipality undertakes the per-
formance of those functions, whether voluntarily or by legisla-
tive imposition, the municipality becomes an arm of sovereignty
and a governmental agency and is entitled to that immunity from
liability which is enjoyed by the state itself. If, on the other
hand, there is no obligation on the part of the municipality to
perform them, but it does in fact do so for the comfort and con-
venience of its citizens, for which the city is directly compen-
sated by levying assessments upon property or where it is in-
directly benefited by growth and prosperity of the city and its in-
habitants, and the city has an election whether to do or omit to do
those acts, the function is private and proprietary.
Another familiar test is whether the act is for the common
good of all the people of the state, or whether it relates to special
corporate benefit or profit. In the former class may be mentioned
the police, fire, and health departments, and in the latter class
utilities to supply water, light, and public markets. 12
A distinctly different approach and minority view is followed in
Alaska where the governmental versus proprietary function concept is
not recognized. In that jurisdiction both a county and a municipality
are fully liable for the negligence of their servants just as a private
business would be.' 3 The same result is reached in New York by
statute.1
4
Among the majority of the courts which determine county and mu-
nicipal liability by drawing a distinction between governmental and pro-
prietary functions the weight of authority has held that the operation of
a hospital is a governmental function and, hence, there is immunity from
tort liability.' 5 In contrast a minority of states have determined that the
2Id. at 284.
13Tuengel v. City of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. Alaska 1954).
14 N.Y. Court of Claims Act, §8. N.Y. General Municipal Law, §50-d. Becker v.
City of New York, 2 N.Y. 2d 226, 140 N.E. 2d 262 (1957).
'5 Lee v. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 326 P. 2d 1117 (1958) ; Calkins v. Newton, 36
Cal. App. 2d 262, 97 P. 2d 523 (1939); Waterman v. Los Angeles County
General Hospital, 123 Cal. App. 2d 143, 266 P. 2d 221 (1954); Talley v.
Northern San Diego Hospital District, 41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P. 2d 22 (1953) ;
Durst v. County of Colusa, 9 Neg. Cases 2d 93, 333 P. 2d 789 (Cal. App. Ct.
1958) (Immunity in county even though plaintiff a paying patient) ; (Com-
pare statute in California which renders county hospital liable for a dangerous
or defective condition of premises, Cal. Govt. Code Ann. Sec. 53050.) Schwalb
v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P. 2d 667 (1947); Williams v. City of Indian-
apolis, 26 Ind. App. 628, 60 N.E. 367 (1901) ; Van Pelt v. City of Louisville,
257 Ky. 256, 77 S.W. 2d 942 (1934); Thomas v. Board of County Com-
missioners of Prince George's County, 200 Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952);
Young v. City of Worcester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N.E. 204 (1925) ; Martinson
v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W. 2d 148 (1950) ; City of Leland v.
Leach, 227 Miss. 558, 86 So. 2d 363 (1956) ; Schroeder v. City of St. Louis,
360 Mo. 293, 228 S.W. 2d 677 (1950) ; Kress v. City of Newark, 8 N.J. 562,
86 A. 2d 185 (1952) ; Elliott v. Lea County, 58 N.M. 147, 267 P. 2d 131 (1954) ;
Hitchings v. Albemarle Hospital, 220 F. 2d 716 (4th Cir. 1955); Lloyd v.
City of Toledo, 42 Ohio App. 36, 180 N.E. 716 (1931); Hand v. Philadelphia,
8 Pa. County 213 (1890) ; Jerauld County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.,
76 S.D. 1, 71 N.W. 2d 571 (1955); Johnson v. Hamilton County, 156 Tenn.
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operation of a hospital by a political subdivision is a proprietary function
resulting in liability for negligence of its servants.'0
By the reasoning of the above courts it makes no difference whether
the plaintiff was a paying patient or a charity patient. Furthermore, the
result is not altered by whether the operation of the hospital by the
governmental unit was undertaken voluntarily or whether it was an
activity required by state statute. Some jurisdictions, however, have
drawn a distinction between a paying patient and a non-paying patient
holding that the governmental subdivision is operating in a proprietary
capacity as to the former and not the latter." Furthermore, there is
some authority to the effect that the acivity of operating a hospital is
proprietary when it is done in pursuant to a permissive statute, as com-
pared with a mandatory statute requiring the establishment of a hos-
pital.'
In several states there is a waiver of county and municipal immunity
to the extent of existing liability insurance coverage. This result is
reached by either judicial decision or statute.'9 In Georgia, any county
hospital organized under the Hospital Authority Act is liable by reason
of judicial construction of the "sue and be sued" provision of the
statute.20 Such is not the general rule.
298, 1 S.W. 2d 528 (1927) ; McMahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hospital, (Tenn.)
306 S.W. 2d 41 (1957); City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W. 2d
872 (1937); City of Richmond v. Long's Adm'r., 17 Grat. 375 (Va. 1867);
Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital District, 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P. 2d 662
(1956). Immunity by statute. Wash. Rev. Code §70.44.060 (1953); Shaffer
v. Monongalia General Hospital, 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E. 2d 795 (1950).
16 City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942) ; Goff v. Fort Lauder-
dale, 67 Fla. 324, 65 So. 2d 1 (1953) ; Bourgeois v. Dade County, 243 La. 1,
99 So. 2d 575 (1957); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W. 2d 639(1952); Swigerd v. Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W. 2d 217 (1956); (It
should be noted, however, that these two Minnesota cases fail to discuss
the doctrine of governmental immunity and simply reach the conclusion that
there is liability.) Kardulas v. Dover, 99 N.H. 359, 111 A. 2d 327 (1955).
(Paying patients; not clear whether rule confined to such.); Okmulgee v.
Carlton, 180 Okla. 605, 71 P. 2d 722 (1937) ; City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101
Okla. 60, 223 P. 354 (1924); (Oklahoma cases concerned paying patients but
it is believed that result not confined to this type of patient).
17 Beard v. City and County of San Francisco, 79 Cal. App. 2d 753, 180 P. 2d
744 (1947). (Municipal hospital. Compare California cases re county and
district hospitals.) Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 P. 2d
597 (1935); Stolp v. City of Arkansas City, 180 Kan. 197, 303 P. 2d 123
(1956) ; Anderson v. City of Portland, 130 Me. 214, 154 A. 572 (1931).
Is Wittmer v. Letts, 248 Iowa 648, 80 N.W. 2d 561 (1957) (Case involved paying
patient in a county hospital) ; Stolp v. City of Arkansas City, supra note 17.
19 Del. Code Ann. Title 18, §516 (Supp. 1958). Idaho Code §§41-3304, 41-3305
(Supp. 1957). Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E. D. Ill. 1954). But see
Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit District Number 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E. 2d 89 (1959); Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. of
America, 232 Ala. 601, 169 So. 132 (1936). Md. Ann. Code Article 48a, §85
(1957). (Not yet authoritatively determined whether or not this statute ap-
plies to governmental hospitals. See Thomas v. Board of County Commis-
sioners of Prince George's County, 200 Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952)). Mc-
Mahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hospital, supra note 15.
20 Hospital Authority of Hall County v. Shubert, 96 Ga. App. 222, 99 S.E. 2d
708 (1957).
1960]
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The states which by judicial decision follow one or more of the
divergent views mentioned regarding county and municipal liability-
and New York, which has completely withdrawn immunity by statute-
represent an effort and perhaps a trend to eliminate from American
law the traditional doctrine of governmental immunity. As govern-
mental subdivisions engage in increasingly widespread activities, the
argument that the reason for the doctrine of governmental immunity
no longer exists is bound to be heard more often. Future court de-
cisions are likely to restrict the scope of the immunity rule as applied
to city and county hospitals and additional statutes concerning the
doctrine are not unlikely.
The recent Illinois case of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District Number 40221 illustrates current judicial philosophy toward gov-
ernmental immunity. The court overruled prior decisions and held that a
school district was liable for the negligence of a bus driver. It argued
that a loss caused by a governmental servant should not in view of
modern social development be borne solely by the injured individual.
Rather the loss should be distributed among the entire community
where it can be borne without hardship upon any individual. The
court added that a school district can handle its financial problems the
same as any private business. The reasoning of the court appears
applicable to county and municipal hospitals. Prior decisions, like Tracy
v. Davis,22 which found a waiver of immunity to the extent of existing
liability insurance coverage, are no longer authoritative as the court
in the Molitor decision felt that this approach was not an adequate
answer to the problem. The applicability of the doctrine of respondeat
superior in Illinois to a governmental unit is now a question solely
for the legislature. It has the choice of permitting the judicial philosophy
to prevail or it can re-establish immunity via statute.
CHARITABLE HOSPITAL IMMUNITY
A significant percentage of hospitals in the United States are in
the category of privately-incorporated, non-profit institutions. These
are also termed voluntary or charitable hospitals. Whether a given
organization is charitable is determined by what its charter provides
and by its actual operation. The essence of establishing the charitable
characteristic is that there must be no private profit for any individual
or group. The fact that certain departments of the hospital or even
the fact that the institution as a whole earns a profit is immaterial so
long as the profit inures to the benefit of the organization as a charity,
as contrasted with a private profit. A hospital does not lose its charit-
able status by admitting paying patients or by enforcing its legal right
21 See supra note 19.
22 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Ill. 1954).
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to payment of the account. The charitable hospital does jeopardize its
status, contrary to the position of a private for-profit hospital, if it
summarily rejects a patient on the sole basis that he is unable to pay
for his care. However, it is to be emphasized that the extent to which
free service is rendered is not conclusive on the issue of whether or
not a given institution is charitable and, conversely, the fact that a
private for-profit hospital sometimes renders free service does not
make it charitable.
Once the charitable status of a medical care institution is established,
an immediate question arises regarding the applicability of the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Historically, the law of the majority of the
states has held the charitable institution immune from the negligence
of its agents and servants and hence respondeat superior has not been
applied. There is a definite and apparently conclusive trend away from
this position and toward liability. Today the law in this area varies
from complete immunity to complete liability, with a number of states
assuming compromise positions.
The beginning of charitable immunity in the United States is found
in the case of McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.23 It was
there held that the funds of a charitable hospital constitute a trust fund
and as such may not be depleted and diverted from the intended pur-
pose of public charity to the payment of compensation to persons
injured by the negligence of the hospital's servants so long as the ad-
ministrators of the trust have selected the servants with due care.2 4
It has been argued that such diversion would be contrary to the intent
of the donor of the funds and would discourage further donations for
charitable purposes. The case was based upon the earlier English case
of Holliday vs. St. Leonard's,2 5 which in turn had rested upon dictum
in Duncan v. Findlater.26 Curiously, neither of these cases involved the
tort liability of charitable institutions. Furthermore, the dictum of the
Duncan case had been overruled in Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs,27
in the year 1866 and the Holliday case had been reversed in 1871 before
the McDonald case by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury.2 All of this
prompted the Supreme Court of Washington to remark in Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital,9 that when a court modifies an
earlier decision it usually does so with the explanation that "the reason
for the rule no longer exists," but that in regard to charitable im-
23 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
24 Later Massachusetts case held no liability even if negligence in selection and
retention of servants. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66,126
N.E. 392 (1920).
.25 11 C.B. N.S. 192 (1860).
26 7 English Reprint 934 (1839).
27 11 English Reprint 1500, 11 H. L. Cas. 686 (1866).
28 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
29 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).
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munity the court should state that "the rule of immunity never did
exist."
Soon after the McDonald case in Massachusetts, the Rhode Island
court was faced with the question of whether or not a charitable hos-
pital was liable for the negligent act of an intern. The court rejected
immunity and held the hospital liable.3 ° Following this decision the
legislature enacted a statute granting immunity, thereby repudiating
the Glavin decision. The statute is still in effect.3 1
DIFFERENT IMMUNITY THEORIES
The majority rule developed in the United States was to follow
the lead of Massachusetts in holding charitable hospitals immune
from liability in tort, but not all states reached the result on the trust
fund theory.32 Several different theories were developed to support
immunity. One group of decisions based the doctrine upon the argu-
ment that a patient in a charitable hospital impliedly waives his right
to damages for injuries caused by negligence because he has accepted
the benefits of the charity. 3 Most of these states have found a waiver
even though the patient paid for the hospital services as he is still a
beneficiary of the charity.3 4 Another theory underlying immunity is
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to charities
for the reason that vicarious liability is imposed only where the servant
is employed to produce a profit for the master.3 5 Still another argu-
ment has been that private charitable institutions are entitled to the
same immunity as government inasmuch as both exist for the public
benefit.3 6 Finally, some courts have simply said that public policy dic-
tates immunity. 7 Sometimes associated with this theory are the argu-
ments that donors to charity would be discouraged from further dona-
tions if the charitable funds could be wiped out by one plaintiff via
a substantial verdict and that it is better to sustain the charity which
serves many people rather than hamper it by awarding damages to the
small minority who may be injured. Perhaps it was a philosophy of
public policy which prompted Chief Justice Folland of the Utah Su-
preme Court to remark in a dissenting opinion in Sessions v. Thomas
D. Dee lemorial Hospital Association,5 "It is better for a few indi-
viduals to suffer than that the whole community should be deprived of
30 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
31 R.I. General Laws, §7-1-22 (1956).
32 For a leading case following the trust fund theory see: Parks v. Northwestern
University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905).
3 Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 F. 294, (1st Cir. 1901).
3- St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924) ; Downs
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 505, 60 N.W. 42 (1894).
s Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 AtI. 595 (1895).
3r University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907).
37 Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910).
38 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938).
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a much needed charitable institution." In that decision the majority
of the court had refused to follow immunity.
It is apparent that the courts of the various states have been unable
to agree on the theory of and the arguments in support of the charitable
immunity doctrine. Historically, the cases indicate confusion, an in-
dulgence in pure fiction, and several conflicting irreconcilable argu-
ments. The several theories have each logically led to exceptions and
modifications. These in turn have produced much conflict in the law
from state to state and several results which appear to be unjustified.
It follows from the trust fund theory, for instance, that a negli-
gently-injured plaintiff can recover from non-trust assets including the
proceeds from liability insurance carried by the charity. 39 Thus, the
ability of the plaintiff to recover is made dependent upon the existence
of assets not a part of the trust. In effect, the charity is permitted to
determine its obligation to compensate for its wrong via its voluntary
acquisition of insurance or non-trust assets. Furthermore, the reason
for acquisition of insurance and its function from the viewpoint of the
insured is to shift a risk of financial loss and not to create a risk of loss
or an obligation to pay. A legal obligation to pay should not depend
upon the existence of insurance. Such a result, although theoretically
logical with the trust fund theory of immunity, appears socially and
economically unjustified.
Similarly, in Louisiana and Arkansas, it has been held pursuant to
statute that the immunity of the insured hospital is not available as a
defense by the insurer.40 In Maryland the plaintiff may not bring suit
directly against the insurer, as in Louisiana and Arkansas, but there
is a statute which provides, in effect, that immunity is no defense when
insurance coverage exists.4 1
A number of states have held that the charity is liable to employees,
visitors, and strangers and immune only as to patient beneficiaries.
42
This result appears consistent with the implied waiver theory of im-
munity and is contrary to the expected result under the trust fund
theory. Furthermore, there has been a difference of opinion as to
whether or not a paying patient is a beneficiary of the charity. A few
jurisdictions have held that there is liability to the paying patient and
39 St. Luke's Hospital Association v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952).
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950); Morton v. Savannah
Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918) ; Vanderbilt University v. Hender-
son, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W. 2d 284 (1938).
40 Stamos v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 119 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. La. 1954);
McElroy v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd., 163 F. Supp. 193 (D.
Ark. 1958) 8 Neg. Cases 2d 785; Ark. Stat. Ann. §66-517 (1957).
41ld. Code Ann., Art. 48 A, §85 (1957).
42 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929)(Employee); Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, 113 Conn.
188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931) (Stranger); Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v.
Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914) (Stranger).
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have restricted immunity to the non-paying patient.4 3 This is done on
the theory that only the latter waives his right to damages. Such a
distinction only magnifies the fiction of the implied waiver theory.
It is consistent with the trust fund theory to hold that there is im-
munity for both negligence of the hospital itself and for vicarious liabili-
ty based upon respondeat superior. As noted previously, negligence of
the hospital itself can be found in the furnishing of defective equip-
ment, defects in buildings or grounds, or the lack of due care in the
selection or retention of personnel. Accordingly, some courts have held
that there is immunity on these facts '.4 4 In contrast, the inapplicability
of respondeat superior theory of immunity leads inescapably to the
conclusion that there is liability for corporate neglect. Thus, it has been
frequently stated that the hospital will be liable for the furnishing of
defective equipment or for negligence in the selection or retention of
personnel even though it is immune from vicarious liability for the
negligent acts of the employees themselves. 4
5
In view of the extreme divergence among the states regarding
charitable immunity, the weaknesses in the underlying theories of the
doctrine, and the questionable social and economic justification for the
results produced, it is not surprising to be witnessing a judicial trend
away from the rule. At the present time, more than one-quarter of the
states hold that a charitable hospital is fully liable just as a for-profit
enterprise would be.46 Several of these reached the result of full lia-
bility by overruling prior decisions recognizing either total or qualified
immunity and it is these states that indicate the trend.47 At the other
43 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) (Doubt
re non-pay) ; Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60,
297 P. 2d 1041 (1956) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906,
55 So. 2d 142 (1951) (Some doubt re non-pay); Pierce v. Yakima Valley
Memorial Hospital, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953) ; Lyon v. Tumwater
Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P. 2d 128 (1955).
44 Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920)
(No liability for negligent selection or retention of personnel) ; Gregory v.
Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) (No liability
for negligent selection or retention of personnel) ; Abston v. Waldon Acade-
my, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S.W. 351 (1907) (No liability for failure to erect fire
escapes as required by city ordinance).
45 Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) ; Martino v.
Grace - New Haven Community Hospital, 146 Conn. 735, 148 A. 2d 259 (1959) ;
St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924); Baptist
Memorial Hospital v. McTighe, 303 S.W. 2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957);
Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949). (Defective equipment) ; Penaloza v. Baptist Memorial Hos-
pital, 304 S.W. 2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Norfolk Protestant Hospital
v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934) ; Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis,
5 Wash. 2d 204, 105 P. 2d 32 (1940) (Defective equipment); Roberts v.
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
46Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey (recovery limited to $10,000 by temporary statute),
New York, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, and possibly North Dakota.
4 Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951) ; Malloy v.
Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951) ; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital,
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extreme, slightly more than one-third of the jurisdictions appear to
apply the rule of immunity to all patients.48 The remaining states that
have ruled on the question fall roughly into the category of drawing a
distinction between paying and non-paying patients,49 or the category
of permitting recovery only from insurance or other non-trust assets
or both.50 Among the immunity states, however, as noted earlier, a
significant number find liability to patients upon proof of failure to
use due care in the selection or retention of employees or other form
of negligence of the hospital itself, thus confining immunity to the
negligent acts of servants and agents. Also, many find liability to
strangers. Only a relatively small minority of the states follow the rule
of total and complete immunity under all facts and circumstances.
Despite the trend noted in favor of charitable hospital liability,
there is still in some jurisdictions strong support for immunity. In
1954, the Supreme Court of Kansas overruled immunity in the case
of Noel v. Menninger Foundation5 ' and the legislature reacted with a
statute effective April 1, 1959 reinstating immunity. The statute does
not prevent the payment of a claimant from the proceeds of insur-
ance. Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have recently
reasserted the doctrine of immunity.52 Essentially, these courts have
argued that to change the immunity rule, regardless of the merits of
the question, would be judicial legislation and hence any change must
come from the legislature. In so ruling, the Virginia court specifically
conceded that the wisdom of the rule of immunity was debatable.
The most forceful arguments against charitable immunity are that
it is "protected negligence," that it is inconsistent with sound social
241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.WAr. 2d 151 (1950); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear
Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276 (1958) ; Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3,
143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957) ; Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N.E. 2d 410 (1956).
48 Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, RhodeIsland (statute), South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
WAryoming. Lower court decisions in Michigan have overruled immunity and
an appeal decision is awaited.
49 Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Washington, and perhaps Alabama.
Idaho, Mississippi, and Washington have held the charitable hospital liable
to the paying patient after prior decisions which indicated non-liability. Con-
sequently, it is believed that these three states further evidence the trend
away from immunity. For case citations, see note 32, supra. It would not be
surprising to have these jurisdictions adopt a rule of full liability.50 Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, and
Tennessee. The recent Illinois case of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District Number 302, supra note 19, disapproves of this rule as applied to
governmental immunity and appears to forecast an end to the rule as applied
to charitable immunity.
5' 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).52 Martino v. Grace New Haven Community Hospital, 146 Conn. 735, 148 A. 2d
259 (1959); Cornelius v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, 219 Md. 116, 148 A. 2d
567 (1959); Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30 (1958);
Memorial Hospital v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E. 2d 388 (1959).
1960]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
policy which dictates that losses suffered by individuals through fault
of another should be borne by all of society through insurance or simi-
lar loss distributive techniques, and that the rule produces the anomaly
that a doer of good asks exemption from responsibility for its wrong
even though all others must pay.33 Fundamentally, the question is one
of social policy and in spite of the recent decisions noted upholding
immunity on the doctrine of stare decisis it may reasonably be antici-
pated that the doctrine will continue to be gradually eliminated from the
law. It would not be surprising, however, to witness concurrently an
effort by statute to place a ceiling on the dollar amount of damages
recoverable by a plaintiff from a charitable hospital. Such a ceiling
would serve to refute the argument in favor of immunity that a hand-
some judgment or two would destroy the charity's ability to serve
society.
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Once the question of immunity has been disposed of where recovery
is sought against the hospital for the negligent or wrongful act of a
person working in the hospital, the issue then presented is whether or
not the actor was the servant or the agent of the hospital at the time
of the injury-producing incident. An employment relationship may be,
as a general matter of law, whether in a hospital or elsewhere, that of
principal-agent, master-servant, or employer-independent contractor.
The doctrine of respondeat superior holds the principal liable to a third
party injured by the tortious act of the agent and the master liable
for the tortious act of his servant committed while furthering the prin-
cipal's or master's business. On the other hand, the employer is not
liable for a negligent or wrongful-acting independent contractor unless
the work being done by the latter is deemed to be inherently danger-
ous 54 or unless there is some compelling reason of public policy to
impose vicarious liability on the employer.55 The liability or non-liabil-
ity of a hospital has traditionally been dependent upon identifying the
actor as an agent, a servant, or an independent contractor. This identifi-
cation is frequently difficult in the perspective of highly developed and
complicated medical procedures.
Properly speaking an agent is defined as one who represents his
principal in business dealings or contractual negotiations with third
parties. The very purpose of agency is to bind the principal and the
third party in contract. In contrast, a servant performs manual or
53 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 Fed. 2d 810
(D.D.C. 1942).
54 Cage, et al., v. Creed, 308 S.W. 2d 78 (Tex. 1957), illustrates the inherently
dangerous exception to the general rule. Excavation in public highway is an
inherently dangerous activity and the employer is liable for the negligence
of the excavator.
55 Adams v. F. -W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc. 27, 257 N.Y.S. 776 (1932). Em-
ployer liable for tort of detective agency, an independent contractor.
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mechanical acts for his master under the latter's direction and control.
The servant does not deal with third parties for the purpose of binding
his employer in contract. In speaking of the master-servant relation-
ship, the Kentucky court in American Savings Life Insurance Co. v.
Riplinger,5 6 said, "A servant is a person subject to the command of his
master as to the manner in which he shall do his work and the master
is the one who not only prescribes the work but directs, or may direct,
the manner of doing the work." In actual practice courts frequently
use the terms "agent" and "servant" interchangeably.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
An independent contractor is "one who exercises some independent
calling, occupation, or employment, in the course of which he under-
takes, supplying his own materials, servants, and equipment, to accom-
plish a certain result, not being subject while doing so to the direction
and control of his employer, but being responsible to his employer for
the end to be achieved, and not for the means by which he accom-
plished it.''57
The Iowa court in Burns v. Eno,"' listed the tests of an in-
dependent contractor as follows: "The commonly recognized
tests of such a relationship are, although not necessarily concur-
rent or each in itself controlling: (1) the existence of a contract
for the performance by a person of a certain piece or kind of
work at a fixed price; (2) independent nature of his business
or of his distinct calling; (3) his employment of assistants with
the right to supervise their activities; (4) his obligation to fur-
nish necessary tools, supplies, and materials; (5) his right to con-
trol the progress of the work, except as to final results; (6) the
time for which the workman is employed; (7) the method of
payment, whether by time or job; (8) whether the work is part
of the regular business of the employer."
It is to be noted that the above quotation emphasizes that the factors
listed are not necessarily concurrent or each in itself determinative.
However, the key test for distinguishing between a servant and an
independent contractor is frequently that of control. A servant is sub-
ject to his master's right of control in regard to both the means and
methods of doing the work and also in regard to final result whereas
an independent contractor is subject to the employer's right of control
only in regard to final result. This is the basis for the rule that an
employer is not liable for the tortious conduct of an independent con-
tractor as it is thought that no vicarious liability should exist if there
is no right to control the workman's activities.
It is clear that where immunity is not applicable, a hospital is liable
56 249 Ky. 8, 60 S.W. 2d 115 (1933).
57 fechen, Agency, p. 13, §20 (3rd ed. 1923).
5s 213 Iowa 881, 240 N.W. 209 (1932).
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under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of a non-
professional employee. In Ray v. Tucson Medical Center,59 the patient
was injured when thrown to the ground after a nurse's aide lost control
of a four-wheel stretcher being used to convey the patient to the hos-
pital's physiotherapy department. A master-servant relationship existed
between the hospital and the nurse's aide as the former possessed the
right to control the latter's work. Hence the hospital was vicariously
liable for her negligence.6°
At the other extreme of hospital employment relationships, it has
been the general rule that a fully licensed and practicing physician
who simply has hospital medical or surgical staff privileges is an in-
dependent contractor and not a servant or an agent of the hospital. The
mere fact that a professional person is on the staff of a medical care
institution does not result in a finding that he is a servant. A recent
leading case is Mayers v. Litow, et al.,61 where Dr. Litow, a staff
physician of Midway Hospital, advised the patient to undergo surgery.
He was assisted during the surgical procedure by another staff doctor.
A severed nerve resulted in a paralyzed vocal cord. The patient was
not successful in a suit against the hospital. The court said that normally
the question of agency is one of fact for the jury, but that here this
could not be so because there was no evidence at all that the doctors
were servants of the hospital. They were simply medical staff men
who used the hospital facilities to perform the surgery. The court
stressed that the contract for medical treatment was between the patient
and Dr. Litow; that the hospital had no right to control the doctors'
acts; that the doctors were not paid by the hospital; that the plaintiff
had made his own financial arrangements directly with the hospital
for his institutional care; and that the surgeon had never done any-
thing nor said anything permitting the plaintiff to infer that he was
the hospital's servant.
The same result has been reached even though the staff doctor is an
officer and/or or a principal shareholder of the hospital corporation.62
These courts emphasize that there is a distinction between the mana-
gerial and medical activities of the physician. As to the latter he acts
as an independent contractor. The hospital corporation is entirely
separate from its managers and stockholders.
The emphasis in the reasoning of Iterman, et al., v. Baker,6 in
59 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
60 Similarly, charity hospital liable to one not a patient for negligence of hospital
elevator operator. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St.
52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).61 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P. 2d 351 (1957).
62 Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, et al., 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915);
Black v. Fischer, et al., 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923) ; Stacy v. Wil-
liams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S.W. 2d 697 (1934).63 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E. 2d 365 (1938).
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reaching the same result of the hospital's non-liability for the negligent
act of a physician was that a corporation may not practice medicine
either directly or indirectly by employing licensed physicians. A doctor
may not, the court argued, accept directions regarding his medical
work from an unlicensed corporation and, hence, the doctors must be
independent contractors. The hospital's contract with the patient is
only to furnish medical services to be rendered by others and it does
not undertake to practice medicine through servants. It is liable only
if it negligently selects physicians to treat the patient. This case repre-
sents a strict application of the corporate practice rule and the same
easoning is recognized elsewhere but certainly not universally.54
The holding that a technically-trained professional person is an
independent contractor is not confined to licensed physicians. Runyan
v. Goodrum6 5 held that an x-ray technician was an independent con-
tractor for the reason that she possessed peculiar knowledge and acted
pursuant to her own initiative and discretion without direction from
her employer, a private hospital owned and operated by physicians.
One of the factors stressed by the California court in Mayers v.
Litow60 was the fact that the surgeons were not paid by the hospital.
Theoretically, the payment of a salary to a staff physician, where the
same is permitted under the corporate practice rule or done by the
hospital in spite of legal rule, should not change the result that he is
an independent contractor. Salary does not necessarily mean the hos-
pital has a right to control a professional person's activities and hence
it is not necessarily inconsistent with an employer-independent con-
tractor relationship.
Nevertheless, some cases have held that the payment of a salary to
a staff physician or other professionally-trained person renders the
doctrine of respondeat superior applicable so that the hospital becomes
vicariously liable for the negligence of the recipient of the salary. In
Gilstrap v'. Osteopathic Hospita,67 the hospital was liable for the mal-
practice of a staff surgeon committed during a tonsil operation. The
court simply held that a salary, which remained the same regardless
of the number of patients treated by the doctor, negatived the hos-
pital's defense that the negligent actor was an independent contractor.
Similar results are found elsewhere.6 Most of the cases so ruling seem
to involve a for-profit hospital.
These courts, in effect, are holding that a hospital does more than
04 A similar case is Rosane v. Senger, et al., 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. 2d 372 (1944).
65 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921).
00 Supra note 61.
67224 Mo. App. 24 S.W. 2d 249 (1929).
68 Brown v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 138 Cal. 475, 71
Pac. 516 (1903) ; Brant v. Sweet Clinic, et al., 167 Wash. 166, 8 P. 2d. 972(1932); Vaughn v. Memorial Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925);
Treptan, et al., v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W. 2d 108 (1945).
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contract with the patient to furnish medical services to be rendered by
others. Rather they are saying that the hospital contracts to treat the
patient and are rejecting the argument of Iterman et al., v. BakerG9
that a corporation is prohibited from practicing medicine. The
hospital can render medical treatment only through servants and the
employment of a physician on salary makes him a servant. They
have ignored the fact that the hospital has no actual control and prob-
ably no right to control the professional activities of the salaried
physician. It can well be argued that these cases represent a misap-
plication of the traditional concepts of the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior. However, the moral from the hospital's point of view would
be to avoid the payment of a salary to a staff physician.
When a hospital expressly contracts to perform medical services,
which is not the usual situation, then it is liable for the negligence of
physicians employed by it to discharge the contractual undertaking
with the patient. For instance, in Guisti v. C. H. Weston Co., et al.70
the defendant hospital association had entered a contract with a high
school to provide medical care to members of the school's football
squad. The defendant's doctors were paid a salary and furnished office
space. The court held the defendant vicariously liable rejecting the argu-
ment that the negligent doctors were independent contractors. It said
that the test of the right to exercise control as to the manner and the
details of the doctor's work must give way to the rule that when one
is bound to perform a duty by contract he can't absolve himself by
devolution of the contractual duty upon a stranger or an independent
contractor. 7' Thus, the legal relationship between the hospital and the
the doctors was that of master-servant and respondeat superior is
applicable.
By legal definition, the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat
superior depends upon the relationship in fact between the employer
and the negligent actor who acts while furthering the former's busi-
ness. Applicability is not, as a general rule and in the absence of special
circumstances dependent upon the relationship between the em-
ployer and the injured third party or upon what the third party thinks
the employment relationship to be. If X should drive Y's truck
with permission on an errand of his own and in the process negligently
69 Supra note 63.
70 165 Ore. 525, 108 P. 2d 1010 (1940).
71Compare: Holland v. Eugene Hospital, 127 Ore. 256, 270 P. 784 (1928).
(Where the hospital had not expressly contracted to treat the patient the
court followed the general rule that a staff physician is an independent con-
tractor and hence the hospital is not vicariously liable.) Accord: Jenkins v.
Charleston General Hospital, 90 WV. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922). (A private
for-profit hospital had contracted with patient's employer to render medical
treatment to employees. Hospital liable for act of radiologist employed and
paid by it to carry out hospital's contract.)
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injure P, then P could not, in the absence of an automobile ownership
statute, hold Y liable in damages for X's negligent act. It generally
would not make any difference legally if the truck had Y's name painted
on the side, leading P to reasonably believe that it was Y or Y's servant
who was driving.
Nevertheless, in some cases possible vicarious liability for the negli-
gence of a physician or other professional person has been founded
upon acts of the defendant hospital which cause the patient to reason-
ably believe that the physician is the servant of the institution when
in fact he is not under the control of defendant or perhaps not even
employed by the hospital at all. This is the theory of "ostensible
agency." It ignores both the test of control and the payment of a salary
as determinative of vicarious liability. Furthermore, it ignores the fact
that the negligent actor may be acting in the furtherance of his own
business rather than the hospital's.
In Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic,7 2 the plaintiff
was taken to the defendant hospital after suffering a broken back in
an accident. He was examined by a Dr. Metzinger who told the plain-
tiff that no bones were broken but that x-ray pictures should be taken.
The patient was removed to the x-ray laboratory, which was under the
complete control of a Dr. Joyant. It was shown that markings on the
door read "Los Angeles X-ray Laboratory"; that Dr. Joyant collected
his own fees and none went to the hospital corporation; that the hos-
pital did not dictate rules to Dr. Joyant nor the hours during which the
laboratory was open for business; that he did work on the hospital
patients and that he taught the hospital's students; that the laboratory
equipment was owned personally by the president and a director of
the hospital corporation; that it was located in space owned by the
hospital but that Dr. Joyant did not pay rent. Dr. Joyant took only an
anterior-posterior x-ray, which was negative, and the plaintiff was suc-
cessful in establishing by expert medical testimony that it was accepted
medical practice in the community to take both lateral and anterior-
posterior pictures. Hence Dr. Joyant was guilty of malpractice. The
hospital, of course, denied that Dr. Joyant was its agent or its servant.
In the lower court, there was a trial to a jury which returned a verdict
for the plaintiff against both Joyant and the hospital. The appellate
court affirmed saying that the agency is ostensible when the principal
intentionally or by want of ordinary care causes a third party to reason-
ably believe that another is his agent or servant who is not really em-
ployed by him. It was clear, the court said, that a patient in pain has
no duty to inquire whether doctors are employees or independent con-
tractors. The court concluded that ostensible agency is a question of
fact for the jury and on the facts of this case the evidence was suffi-
7254 Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P. 2d 705 (1942).
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cient to support the jury's finding that Dr. Joyant was an agent or
servant of the hospital corporation.
To like effect is the leading case of Seneris v. Haas,"3 which held
that a prima facie case was established against the hospital and that
the issue of a master-servant relationship should be decided by the jury
where a negligent anesthesiologist was one of six such physicians on
the hospital's staff who had regular "on call" rotating duty. The evi-
dence further indicated that the doctor himself billed the patient for
his professional services but that he had been called to attend the patient
by a hospital nurse and that he did not work elsewhere. In Brown v.
Aloore, et al.,74 partners in a private for-profit sanitarium were held
liable for the professional malpractice of a neuro-psychiatrist named
Dr. Kelly whom they employed on salary as the medical director of
the sanitarium. Dr. Kelly was not a partner and the evidence indicated
that the defendants had no control over his professional activities. The
court reasoned that under the circumstances of employment on salary
it did not believe the doctor to be an independent contractor. Signifi-
cantly, however, the court went on to say that even if it assumed that
Dr. Kelly was an independent contractor as to the defendants still they
were liable for his act because they held out and represented to the
patient and to the public that medical treatment was to be given in the
sanitarium by doctors employed therein. Hence, regardless of the doc-
tor's relationship to the defendants, he is deemed to be their servant
as to the patient making the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable.
In effect, these ostensible agency cases are ruling that the "holding
out" of the physician as a servant, when in fact he is not, estops the
defendant hospital from asserting the true relationship as a defense to
the imposition of vicarious liability. It is true that in each of these
cases the hospital has been the one who selected or supplied the doctor
for the patient. Traditionally, however, this has not been and should
not be recognized as enough standing alone to impose vicarious liability.
Certainly, a physician, a hospital, or a private individual who supplies
or recommends a physician to a patient has not been nor should he be
liable for the latter's malpractice unless they are partners or unless
there is negligence in the recommendation.7 5 Nevertheless, the os-
tensible agency cases are different on their facts from a mere recom-
mendation and perhaps the results are justified as a matter of social
policy when the patient has justifiable grounds for believing that the
defendant is the responsible party. However, the theory greatly expands
possible hospital liability and care should be exercised by the courts to
confine the theory's use to factual situations where there is a true
7345 Cal. 2d 811,291 P. 2d 915 (1955).
74 247 F. 2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957).
' Annot., 46 ALR 1455; Mayer v. Hipke, 183 Wis. 382, 197 N.W. 333 (1924).
[Vol. 44
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
"holding out" and a misrepresentation to the patient. It is noted that
these courts have reached the same result by frankly admitting that
due to the lack of hospital control the physician was an independent
contractor but that, nevertheless, the hospital was liable because the
medical treatment involved inherently dangerous activities. Such reason-
ing would be consistent with the generally recognized exception in the
commercial world to the basic doctrine that an employer is not liable
for the negligence of an independent contractor. However, an ap-
plication of the inherently dangerous activity exception to the medical
field is questionable and would open the door even wider to possible
hospital liability for the acts of the professional staff.76
Resident physicians are licensed to practice medicine but are still
in training perfecting a specialty. Interns are medical school gradu-
ates working in the hospital prior to licensure as a part of their formal
medical education. An employment contract arises between the resident
or intern and the hospital at the time of appointment by the institution.
As a part of the contract the hospital agrees to compensate these profes-
sional people either in the form of a salary or by furnishing living
accommodations or both. The resident and the intern do from time to
time diagnose illness and render medical treatment to patients under
proper supervision of the hospital's director of medical education or
the chief of medical or surgical services. Generally the patient has no
freedom in selecting the resident or intern who cares for him.
Under these circumstances the cases are clear that the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies rendering the hospital vicariously liable
for the negligent acts of residents and interns occurring within their
routine hospital functions. It is said that the facts negative an em-
ployer-independent contractor relationship and this is so even if the
negligence occurs during the performance of a professional act. A pro-
fessional act may be a "routine hospital function" of a resident physi-
cian or intern. The majority of the cases do not speak in terms of the
hospital's right to control the means and methods of the resident's or
intern's activities, but rather simply rule that they are employees of
the hospital making respondeat superior applicable. 77
76 This ostensible agency theory of vicarious liability in the hospital cases is
not without parallel in commercial enterprise. When a department store leases
a given department to an independent operator and then holds itself out as
the owner or the one in control of the lessee's business the store is vicari-
ously liable for the negligence of the lessee. Augusta Friedman's Shop v.
Yeates, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299 (1927). (Store liable for negligence of
beauty shop lessee); Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 N.Y. App. 663, 17 N.Y.S.
2d 741 (1940); Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597
(1901); Combs v. Kobacker Stores, 114 N.E. 2d 447, (Ohio App. 1953).
-7Bowers v. Olch, et al., 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P. 2d 997 (1953) (Hospital li-
able for act of resident surgeon when needle left in abdomen during surgery).
Sepaugh v. Methodist Hospital, 30 Tenn. App. 25, 202 S.W. 2d 985 (1946)
(Hospital liable for act of intern who negligently administered hypodermo-
cylsis injection. Dissent maintained that said injection required technical skill
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A regular duty hospital nurse, by the great weight of authority, has
been considered a servant of the hospital and, hence, where an immu-
nity doctrine is not applicable the hospital is liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for her negligent act or omission committed
within the scope of her normal and usual employment duties even
though the act may be of a professional nature. The negligence of the
nurse is established by proof that she ought to have known or foreseen
that injury or damage to the patient would be the result of her con-
duct.78 In addition to the hospital's vicarious liability the nurse herself
is always personally liable.
Respondeat superior was applied where a nurse administered a
hypodermic injection with an unsterile instrument without first wiping
the skin with an alcoholic sponge ;79 where nurse left a hot water bottle
in bed burning the patient ;so where nurse continued hypodermoclysis
injection after noticing that tissues were not properly absorbing;81
where nurse supervisor permitted student nurse to have keys to medi-
cine room to prepare codeine injection ordered by patient's doctor and
student nurse prepared morphine by mistake resulting in patient's
death ;52 where nurse failed to use care in lowering bed ;53 where nurse
administered scalding hot enema ;84 and where nurse placed tray con-
taining teapot with hot water on table beside bed of drowsy surgical
patient under drugs and left unattended with the result that the water
fell burning the patient.8 5
A nurse's negligence may be found in an omission, a failure to act
or inattentive care as well as in an affirmative act. In the recent case
of Hendricks v. Sanford,8 6 it was held to be a question for the jury
with the hospital neither reserving nor exercising any right to control hence
rendering respondeat superior inapplicable). Moeller v. Hauser and Finkeln-
berg, Moeller v. Lofquist, et al., 237 Minn. 268, 54 N.W. 2d 639 (1952) (Hos-
pital liable for resident's negligent care of a patient in traction). City of
Miami v. Rosa Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942) (Hospital liable for
intern's negligence in preparing patient for cauterization of old surgical
incision). Waynick v. Reardon and Duke University, Inc., 236 N.C. 117, 72
S.E. 2d 4 (1952) (Hospital liable when resident surgeon punctured blood
vessel during surgery on ward patient who was given no choice of doctors).
Andrews v. Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Association, 77 Ohio App. 35,
147 N.E. 2d 645 (1956) (Serum sickness resulting from intern's injection of
tetanus injection). Carver Chiropractic College v. Armstrong, 103 Okla. 123,
229 Pac. 641 (1924) (Intern broke patient's ribs). Stuart Circle Hospital
Corporation v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E. 2d 153 (1939) (Hospital liable when
intern injected pre-x-ray dye solution into tissues).
7 35 Am. Jur. Master and Servant §587 (1941).
7o Kalmus v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, 132 Cal. App. 2d 243, 281 P. 2d 872
(1955).
so Pensacola Sanitarium v. Wilkins, 68 Fla. 447, 67 So. 124 (1914).
81 Parish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933).
82 Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 94 Utah 460, 78 P.
2d 645 (1938).
s Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal. App. 2d 473, 151 P. 2d 17 (1944).
84 City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1924).
5 Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P. 2d 860 (1945).
86216 Ore. 149, 337 P. 2d 974 (1959).
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as to whether it was negligence to fail to turn the patient in bed regu-
larly or at all in a situation where the patient developed bed sores. In
another instance, it was held to be error when the lower court directed
a nonsuit in Thomas v. Seaside Memorial Hospital87 on the following
facts. An eight-month-old baby had undergone minor surgery; the
patient was still under ether and unconscious when returned to the
nursery. The baby's mother was ordered by a nurse to leave the nursery
while other patients were bathed. The nurse herself left the room and
the only hospital attendant remaining in the nursery was a nurse's
aide changing bed clothing. During this interval the baby suffered a
clot which collapsed a lung causing death. There was expert testimony
to the effect that had a trained person been watching the unconscious
infant she might have been able to recognize symptoms and conse-
quently been in a position to render aid saving the life. There are other
cases relating to a nurse's failure to act or inattentive care. s8
One of the most recent cases involving a nurse's failure to act is
Goff vs. Doctors General Hospital of San Jose.Y' The patient's physi-
cian had made an incision to facilitate childbirth; he failed to suture
it. This act was conceded to be negligence rendering the doctor liable
for malpractice. Suit was also brought against the hospital and two
nurses on the allegations that the latter were negligent in failing to
check the patient's pulse, blood pressure, temperature, and respiration;
in failing to call the doctor when first aware that bleeding was above
normal because the nurses doubted that the doctor would come to the
hospital; and, finally, in failing to notify the hospital administrative
authorities that they were "horrified" at the treatment that the doctor
s8 80 Cal. App. 2d 841, 183 P. 2d 288 (1947).
S8 Tulsa Hospital Association v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519 (1918). (Failure
of nurse to change bed clothing for two hours after discovery that patient
was wet from leaking roof; said failure caused pneumonia. Hospital liable.)
Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity and General Hospital Association, 96 Nebr. 636,
148 N.W. 582 (1914). (Absence of nurse from room of delirious patient for
five minutes may amount to negligence.) Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hospital,
137 Okla. 133, 278 Pac. 334 (1929). (Nurse waited for 22 hours and failed
to call doctor after patient repeatedly requested catheterization.) Williams
v. Pomona Valley Hospital Association, 21 Cal. App. 359, 131 Pac. 888 (1913).
(Failure of nurse to exercise continuous care and to follow up after placing
hot water bottles on feet of unconscious patient.) Birmingham Baptist Hos-
pital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928). (Hospital liable when
nurse left expectant mother unattended and did not call doctor in time to
deliver child. Whether in fact the child was stillborn or died soon after birth
due to lack of attention held question for jury.) Sherman v. Hartman, et al.,
137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P. 2d 894 (1955). (Surgical patient returned to
hospital room and during blood transfusion needle came out of vein causing
blood to enter tissue. Nurse had left patient to go to lunch leaving a male
orderly to watch patient. Res ipsa loquitur applied and respondeat superior
renders hospital liable.) Valentin v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance
Mutuelle, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359 (1946). (Nurse permitted
patient to go for three days without calling doctor after becoming aware of
patient's deteriorating condition.)
s9 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 29 (1958).
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was rendering. After judgment for the hospital and the nurses, the trial
judge granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The appellate court
affirmed, saying that the omissions by the nurses were sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding of negligence and a consequent liability of
the hospital on respondeat superior. There was expert testimony to the
effect that the nurses' care was not commensurate with the skill ordi-
narily used by nurses in good standing in the community. He further
testified that the nurses should have called the patient's attending
physician sooner; should have notified their hospital administrative
superior; that time was of the essence and that if proper care had
been summoned sooner the chance of saving the patient's life would
have been greater. The nurses' duty to call their hospital administra-
tive superior when they knew that the attending physician was not
caring properly for the patient raises important implications. Appar-
ently, it would put the hospital in the position of attempting to remove
the case from the hands of a private physician employed by the patient
and who was not an employee of the hospital.
The fact that the nurse's negligence occurs while acting pursuant
to the orders of the patient's physician does not insulate the hospital
from liability. For instance, the doctor in Rice v. Lutheran Hospital,
supra, had prescribed that the patient be served tea. However, this
does not make the nurse who served the tea the servant of the doctor
and shift the vicarious liability for her negligence to him for the reason
that the doctor, even though he had ordered the tea, was not super-
vising and controlling the serving. The hospital still had the right to
direct and control the nurse's act and hence the nurse was still the
servant of the hospital.90 On such facts the borrowed servant rule
does not apply.
Under the borrowed servant rule a hospital nurse, an intern, or other
person generally in the employ of the hospital may temporarily become
a servant of another with the result that the hospital as general em-
ployer is insulated from vicarious liability for the negligent act of the
borrowed servant occurring while he or she is employed by the other.
This is illustrated by the Vermont case of Minogue v. Rutland Hos-
pital, Inc.91 The patient was admitted to the defendant hospital for
childbirth and was under the care of her own private physician who
was not an employee of the hospital. During the delivery the doctor
was assisted by a hospital nurse employed and paid by the defendant.
He directed her to apply pressure to the sides of the patient and during
90 Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, et al., 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W. 2d 217 (1956).
(Hospital liable for nurse's negligence in rendering heat treatments even
though said treatments ordered by physician for the reason that the physician
was not giving and not expected to give direct personal supervision to the
nurse in the carrying out of his prescribed treatment).
91 119 Vt. 336, 125 A. 2d 796 (1956).
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this act the patient's ribs were broken. The patient had paid a fee
to the hospital for the use of the obstetrical department, the delivery
room, and the nurses in attendance there. The court held that a directed
verdict in favor of the hospital should have been given because in this
instance the hospital is not liable for the negligent act of the nurse
for the reason that at the time of the specific transaction in question
she was acting under the control of the doctor and not the hospital.
The rule is frequently applicable in surgical situations. The patient
in Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospita9 2 had
been admitted to the defendant hospital for an appendicitis operation
to be done by a surgeon of her own selection and employment. During
the surgery he was assisted by four nurses all of whom were generally
employed by the hospital. The surgeon called for some "warm water";
one of the nurses obtained some water, but it was deemed to be too
hot; she brought more water, the doctor tested it with his finger, and
following the testing either he or the nurse poured it into the surgical
wound with the result that the patient was burned. The surgeon himself
was admittedly negligent; the plaintiff is his liability insurance carrier
who brings suit against the hospital after settlement with the patient
alleging that the defendant is jointly liable with the doctor for the
negligence of its employee, the nurse. The jury gave a verdict for the
plaintiff but the granting of defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is now affirmed. The court held that the hospital
could not be jointly liable because the servant's negligence occurred
at a time when she was working under the exclusive direction and
control of the surgeon. It said,
The rule is plain that when a general employer assigns his
servant to duty for another and surrenders to the other direction
and control in relation to the work to be done, the servant be-
comes the servant of the other insofar as his services relate to
the work so controlled and directed. His general employer is no
longer liable for the servant's torts committed in the directed
and controlled work. In the operating room the surgeon must be
the master. He can't tolerate any other voice in the control of his
assistant.
93
92212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W. 2d 637 (1942).
93Id. at 639. See also Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hospital, 180 Okla.
513, 71 P. 2d 607 (1937). (Defendant hospital not liable for negligence of
nurse occurring shortly after surgical operation during period of time when
patient's private physician retained immediate supervision over care being
rendered patient.) Beadles v. Metayka, Metayka v. Bowles, et al., 135 Colo.
366, 311 P. 2d 711 (1957). (Hospital not liable when momentarily unattended
surgical patient fell to floor after patient's private surgeon had entered oper-
ating room and assumed command of nurses and hospital orderly assisting
him). Hull v. Enid General Hospital Foundation, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d
693 (1944). (Hospital not liable for negligence of salaried x-ray technicians
while administering -:-ray treatments under control and direction of patient's
private physician).
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Whenever the facts indicate that different inferences could be
drawn as to the identity of the controlling master of an allegedly bor-
rowed servant at the time of the negligent act then it is a question for
the jury. When a hospital intern, in the general employ of the hos-
pital, assisted a surgeon in the performance of a Caesarean section
and the intern applied excessive silver nitrate to the eyes of the new-
born infant the jury was justified in finding that the intern was the
servant of the surgeon.94
When the borrowed servant rule operates to insulate the hospital
from liability, it necessarily logically follows that the temporary master
of the loaned employee is vicariously liable for the latter's negligent
act. In McConnell v. Williams,9 5 the surgeon was liable for the intern's
act as it was found that he had complete control of the operating room
and everyone in it at the time of the negligence although there was no
claim nor evidence that the surgeon was himself negligent. 96
Cases of this nature are to be distinguished from cases where the
negligence has occurred in pre-surgical preparation such as the cleaning
of the operating room, the preparation of sterile drapes or the steriliza-
tion of instruments. Here the acts are done by nurses or others in their
capacity as general servants of the hospital before the surgeon has
assumed command. Similarly, the surgeon is not vicariously liable for
negligent acts of others occurring in the routine post-operative care of
the patient which he is not personally supervising and directing. In
Hallinan v. Prindle,97 the hospital was liable and the surgeon exon-
erated when a nurse during the course of pre-surgical preparation
failed to read the bottle label and by mistake supplied a solution of 4
per cent formalin rather than 1 per cent novocain.
Furthermore, in spite of the quoted language from Saint Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital,9 and the other cited
cases, the surgeon is not always the master of surgical participants and
is not always vicariously responsible for another's negligence in the
operating room. 9" In several sponge count cases it has been held that
94 McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949).
95 Ibid.
9' Accord: Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A. 2d 209 (1956). (Surgeon liable
for negligence of operating room nurse in the preparation and application of
hot water bottles during surgery). Hull v. Enid General Hospital Foundation,
194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d 693 (1944). (Physician liable for negligence of hos-
pital x-ray technicians administering treatments under his control and direc-
tion). Beadles v. Metayka, Metayka v. Bowles, et al., 135 Colo. 366, 311 P. 2d
711 (1957). (Surgeon liable for negligence of orderly or nurse when momen-
tarily unattended patient fell to floor). Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203,
221 Pac. 752 (1923). (Surgeon liable for negligence of hospital nurse assist-
ing him during operation when patient burned by pan of hot water left by
nurse at feet of patient).
07 220 Cal. 46, 29 P. 2d 202 (1934).
9S Supra note 92.
99 Annot. 60 ALR 147 (1929).
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the surgeon is not liable under respondeat superior for an erroneous
sponge count by a nurse for the reason that while making the count
she is the servant of the hospital and not the surgeon. 00 The hospital
is liable. 101 However, the surgeon may be deemed by some courts to
be personally negligent if a miscount of sponges occurs during surgery
as he is not entitled to rely on the nurse's count. 02 In all of these cases
the failure to properly count the sponges resulted in the foreign object
being left in the patient's body.
As a general conclusion it can be said that the facts surrounding
the selection and control of the several participants are determinative
of the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior in surgical
cases where there has been negligence of one or more of the participants
resulting in injury to the patient. In Thompson v. Lillehei'03 the de-
fendants were the University of Minnesota Hospital and six doctors.
The plaintiff was serving as a blood donor for her daughter who was
about to undergo delicate heart surgery. Both the daughter and the
plaintiff were anesthetized and placed on adjoining tables in the oper-
ating room. The anesthetist, at the plaintiff's table, permitted a bottle
of glucose to become empty, causing an air embolism which resulted
in permanent disability to the plaintiff. This anesthetist was a licensed
physician. He was not a defendant in the suit. Plaintiff had no evidence
that the doctor defendants were individually negligent and his case
was based upon the argument that the hospital and other participants
in the surgery were vicariously liable for the negligent act of the an-
esthetist. The suit 'was dismissed against the hospital on the basis of
governmental immunity. It was further held that the head surgeon in
charge was not vicariously liable since he had no power to direct and
control the activities of the anesthetist. Each had a separate role to
play in the surgery and each role required individual attention. The
anesthetist was exercising his own independent medical knowledge
without specific directions from the head surgeon. All of the physician
participants were salaried members of the University of Minnesota
Medical School and had been assigned to this operation by the head of
the surgery department. In view of these facts it might be speculated
whether or not the hospital would have been liable for the anesthetist's
act if immunity had not been applicable. The court was not faced with
this issue.
100 Funk v. Bonham, 151 N.E. 22 (Ind. App. 1926), Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54,
159 N.E. 451 (1928). Baker v. Wentworth, 155 Mass. 338, 29 N.E. 589 (1892).
Niebel v. Winslow, 88 N.J.L. 191, 95 At. 995 (1915).
101 Rural Education Association v. Bush, 298 S.W. 2d 761 (Tenn. 1956).
102 Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S.W. 524 (1925) ; Barnett v. Brand,
165 Ky. 616, 177 SAV. 461 (1915);. Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 Atl. 1007
(1913).
103 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn., 1958), aff'd, 273 F. 2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959).
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Salgo v. Stanford University Board of Trustees" was a similar
team surgery case. The patient suffered paralysis following injection
of barium into the aorta to facilitate x-rays. The procedure had been
prescribed by Dr. Gerbode, a professor at Stanford University Medi-
cal School, and a specialist in cardiovascular surgery. He was present
only at the beginning of this aortography and gave no specific instruc-
tions to the team of physicians doing the procedure consisting of a
surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a radiologist. Dr. Gerbode, as attend-
ing surgeon in charge of the case, was not liable as he had no control
over the activities of the team. On such facts his only liability would
be for failure to use proper care in the selection of the team and in
the determination of its competence.
In some team surgery cases the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has
been applied. Its use is another factor in the picture of expanding
hospital liability. This doctrine asserts that the fact of injury speaks
for itself and permits the jury to infer that the defendant was negligent
without further proof of negligence. Applicability rests upon the pres-
ence of three conditions. First, the injury must be of the kind that
does not ordinarily happen without negligence; second, the injury must
be caused by an instrumentality solely within the control of the de-
fendant; and, third, plaintiff must be free from contributory negligence.
The appellate court in Salgo v. Stanford University Board of Trus-
tees,105 held that res ipsa loquitur could not be applied because there
was testimony to the effect that the unfortunate result of the aorto-
graphy could have happened even if the injection had been administered
properly. This is to be compared with the leading California case of
Ybarra v. Spangard, et al.'16 The plaintiff patient went to the hospital
for an appendicitis operation. Following the surgery the plaintiff suf-
fered paralysis of an arm which medical experts testified was caused
by pressure applied between the right shoulder and the neck. Suit was
brought against the patient's physician, the surgeon, the owner and
operator of the hospital, an anesthetist employed by the hospital and
two nurses. Plaintiff was unable to prove that any particular act of
any particular defendant caused his injury. The court applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur saying that there is an inference of
negligence against all of those who had any control at all over the
patient's unconscious body and that the patient is entitled to an ex-
planation of their conduct. Otherwise, the court reasoned, the plaintiff
would be without a remedy unless someone voluntarily stepped forward
and disclosed the identity of the negligent actor. It could be that at
trial, one or more of the defendants would be found liable and others
104 152 Cal. App. 2d 588, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957).
105 Ibid. 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P. 2d 36 (1956).
106 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944).
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not. Some of the defendant doctors might be found to be independent
contractors; if the negligent actor was either the anesthetist or one of
the nurses then perhaps the hospital is liable as their employer; further,
the borrowed servant rule might apply. The main point is that where
the plaintiff lacks proof of specific acts of negligence and where the
three conditions of res ipsa loquitur are present then the plaintiff is
entitled to an explanation from each defendant as to his conduct and
his relationship with the others who ministered to the patient during
surgery. 0
7
A review of New York cases shows a distinct trend regarding the
applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to hospitals. Until
recently the leading authority was Justice Cardozo's opinion in Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital,0 8 wherein it was held that
a charitable hospital was not liable for the negligence of staff physicians
and nurses for the reason that their work involves professional skill
not under hospital control and hence they are independent contractors.
It was said that the hospital only procures the services of a doctor or
a nurse for the patient and does not make them its agents or servants
to treat the patient. Only if the hospital were negligent in its selection
of doctors and nurses could there be liability. From this grew the no-
tion that there was a difference between medical acts and administrative
acts. The hospital was not liable for negligent injury occurring during
a medical act, but was liable for a negligent administrative act. This
administrative-medical act distinction was also applied to the private
for-profit hospital as well as to the charitable hospital.10 9 It was in
reality a technique for determination of control over the doctor's or
nurse's act and has appeared from time to time in decisions from other
jurisdictions.
As might have been anticipated, it became difficult to draw a logical
line of demarcation between medical and administrative acts. The result
was confusion. For instance, the giving of a blood transfusion to the
wrong patient was held to be an administrative act"0 while the mis-
107 Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, et aL., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P. 2d
36 (1956). (Res ipsa loquitur applies against surgeon, assistant surgeons,
surgical nurse, and hospital where clamp left in patient's abdomen during
operation. Such an injury is ordinarily the result of someone's negligence and
all participants may be called upon to meet the inference of negligence against
them). Mondot v. Vallejo General Hospital, 152 Calif. App. 588, 313 P. 2d
78 (1957). (Res ipsa loquitur applies when foreign object left in plaintiff's
body even though there was a possibility that said object had been left at
a later time when patient under care of another physician).
10s 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
109 Steinert v. Brunswick Home, Inc., 20 N.Y.S. 2d 459 (1940). (Private for-
profit hospital not liable when nurse employed by it prepared by mistake a
caustic solution to be injected as an anesthetic for the reason that her act was
a "medical act").
110 Necolayff v. Genessee Hospital, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E. 2d 117 (1947).
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matching of blood in a transfusion was deemed to be medical."' Simi-
larly, the use of an improperly sterilized needle for hypodermic in-
jection was an administrative act,112 while the improper administration
of a hypodermic injection was medical. 113 Other similar cases likewise
reflect the confusion.1
4
The doctrine of the Schloendorff case and the corresponding dis-
tinction between administrative and medical acts was not applied to
state and city hospitals for the reason that as to them governmental
immunity had been waived by statute.11' As to governmental hospitals,
the institutions were and are fully liable under respondeat superior for
a professional employee's negligent act. Furthermore, there was never
any distinction in New York between a medical and an administrative
act when the act was done by a non-professional employee. In view of
these difficulties and variations, the 1957 case of Bing v. Thunig and
St. John's Episcopal Hospital,"' abandoned all distinction between ad-
ministrative and medical acts. The court adopted the unrestricted doc-
trine of respondeat superior and said simply that the hospital is liable
for the negligent act of one who is its employee and who was acting
at the time of his negligence within the scope of his employment. This
includes nurses and staff physicians and surgeons. In the principal case,
a nurse during preparation for surgery applied an alcoholic antiseptic
solution to the operative area of a surgical patient and in so doing
permitted some of the solution to fall onto the operating table's linen.
Contrary to general hospital rules she failed to inspect the linen and
to remove any that had become contaminated. Later, the surgeon entered
and when he touched an electric cautery to the surgical area there was
"a smell of very hot singed linen." The patient was burned. The court
held the hospital liable for the act of the nurse, saying that the spe-
cialized skill of a staff doctor or a nurse should not be the basis of
"' Berg. v. New York Society for Relief of Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.
2d 499, 154 N.Y.S. 455 (1956).112 Peck v. Towns Hospital, 275 App. Div. 302, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (1949).
113 Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E. 2d 391 (1953).
114 Ranelli v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 295 N.Y. 850, 67 N.E. 2d 257 (1946).(Failing to place sideboards on bed after decision that they were necessary is
administrative). Grace v. Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital,
301 N.Y. 660, 93 N.E. 2d 926 (1950). (Failing to decide that need exists
for use of sideboards is medical). Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical
School and Hospital, 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E. 2d 450 (1946). (The placing
of an improperly capped hot water bottle is administrative). Sutherland v.
New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E. 2d
583 (1948). (Keeping a hot water bottle on patient too long is medical).
Capasso v. The Square Sanitarium, 3 Misc. 2d 273, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 313 (1956).(Nurse set up steam vaporizer and infant patient burned. Held administrative
act and hospital liable). Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, et al., 277
N.Y. App. 572, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 385 (1950). (Pre-surgical preparation by a
nurse of an electric plate in contact with patient's body held medical act).115Liubowsky v. State of New York, 285 N.Y. 701, 34 N.E. 2d 385 (1941).
Becker v. City of New York, 2 N.Y. 2d 226, 140 N.E. 2d 262 (1957).
116 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957).
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denying the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
court pointed out that to call the nurse an independent contractor is
inconsistent with the ruling that she is an employee for the purpose
of workmen's compensation.117 Furthermore, the court rejected the
assertion of the Schloendorff case that a hospital only undertakes to
procure the services of doctors and nurses for the patient. Rather the
hospital does indeed, the court said, treat the patient and acts through
its staff doctors and nurses. Hence, the doctrine of respondeat superior
should apply to hospitals just as it does to any other employer. Clearly
this decision broadens the applicability of respondeat superior and
circumscribes the notion that a professional person using his own skill
and discretion in the performance of professional duties is an inde-
pendent contractor. Of course, in order to hold the hospital liable,
there must be negligence on the part of the professional person. Bing v.
Thunig, supra, did not alter the standard of proof required.118
This development in New York appears to parallel earlier cases in
England where a hospital has been held liable for the negligence of
residence medical officers, house surgeons, x-ray technicians and an-
esthetists."19
SUMMARY
There are three recognizable trends in the law of a hospital's
vicarious liability. The first is a change in attitude toward governmen-
tal immunity. The Federal Torts Claims Act, the New York statute,
and other statutes cited indicate legislative activity in this area and
reasonably forecast that additional statutes will follow. Furthermore,
it is probable that courts in the future will be more anxious than here-
tofore to restrict the scope of governmental immunity at the county
and municipal level by creating additional exceptions and modifications
through expansion of the concept of what constitutes a proprietary
function.
The second trend is the judicial reversal of charitable immunity
by those courts willing to give the doctrine of stare decisis flexibility
to serve current social philosophies. Unless legislatures follow the lead
of Kansas in re-establishing immunity by statute, an event which is
thought to be unlikely, it is to be anticipated that additional courts will
join those who have already overruled or severely restricted the doc-
trine's scope.
The first two trends merely equate the responsibilities of govern-
"1 Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N.Y. 268, 140 N.E. 694 (1923).
(1923).
118 Morwin v. Albany Hospital, 7 App. Div. 2d 582, 185 N.Y.S. 2d 85 (1959).
(Expert Testimony is required to establish malpractice).
119 Fleming, English Law of Medical Liability, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 636 (1959).
See Cassidy, supra note 2. Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council, KB.
598 (1947). Gold v. Essex County Council, 2 K.B. 293 (1942). Roe v. Ministry
of Health, 2 Q.B. 66 (1953).
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mental and charitable hospitals with the for-profit hospital and com-
mercial enterprise generally. The third trend in the law of hospital
liability is the most significant. It is the increasing tendency, aside from
immunity, to impose vicarious liability on facts where none would
have been imposed heretofore. By some leading decisions it no longer
follows that a professional person using his own skill, judgment and
discretion in regard to the means and methods of his work is an inde-
pendent contractor. The hospital may not in any real sense control the
staff physician, intern, or nurse in their medical activities but yet there
is frequently vicarious liability for their negligent professional acts.
By some courts the payment of a salary is more important than control
over the actor's work. Gradually, the test of hospital liability for an-
other's act is becoming simply a question of whether or not the actor
causing injury was a part of the medical care organization.
Those courts following the theory of ostensible agency on appro-
priate facts go even further and find vicarious liability whenever the
hospital has led the patient to reasonably believe that another was in
its employ and under its control. As has been pointed out, this does
not fit the traditional legal tests basing vicarious liability upon the
existence of an actual master-servant relationship with the servant act-
ing under the master's control in the furtherance of the latter's busi-
ness. Neither does it fit the newer development of simply inquiring
whether or not the actor was in fact and actuality a part of the hos-
pital organization because it emphasizes appearance rather than the
true relationship between the actor and the defendant hospital. Re-
gardless of the social merits or de-merits of the theory as it is stated,
it is submitted that courts must use care to strictly limit the concept
to facts where the hospital has truly misled the patient regarding the
identity of the responsible party. There must be a stopping point some-
where to the imposition of vicarious liability. To misunderstand or mis-
apply the ostensible agency theory can only lead to an indistinguishable
line of demarcation between liability and non-liability for another's
tortious conduct. In any event, it would appear that the law is develop-
ing to a point where the only clear-cut line of demarcation is a situa-
tion where the patient himself has clearly and expressly employed and
paid his own private physician or nurse. Otherwise the hospital's de-
fense plea that the negligent actor was an independent contractor is
likely to be unsuccessful.
[Vol. 4
